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FIRST PUBLICATION ABROAD-INVESTIVE,
DIVESTITIVE, OR INOPERATIVE?
A TERRITORIAL VIEW
OF COPYRIGHT
ELIHU INSELBUCH*
I.

INTRODUCTION

T HE purpose of this article is to focus on the questions arising when
a copyrightable work is first published in a country other than the
United States. Specifically, these questions are: (1) whether a first
publication abroad can ever invest United States' statutory copyright;
and, (2) whether a first publication abroad which fails to satisfy investing
requirements of the country of publication, or those of the United States,
serves to divest, forever, the United States' protection.
Recently, two cases in the United States district court for the Southern
District of New York have presented such issues. They are Ross Prods.,
Inc. v. New York Merchandise Co.' and G. P. Putnam's Sons v. Lancer
Books, Inc.- In each case, the first publication was abroad and it did not
contain the notice of copyright required by American law, although it
apparently satisfied whatever local formalities existed.3
Both decisions deny temporary injunctions and in Ross Prods. plaintiff's motion for summary judgment has been denied.4
In Ross Prods., the plaintiff, an American corporation, was the copyright proprietor of an inflatable figure of a baseball catcher. The product
was manufactured in Japan and marketed in the United States with an
appropriate copyright notice. Before the first figures were imported into
the United States, however, the plaintiff had displayed the figure at a
Japanese toy fair and had offered it for sale at various Japanese department stores. As displayed and sold in Japan, the figure did not contain
the notice required by American law.'
The court framed the issue as follows: "We are thus faced with the
case of an American proprietor who has published abroad without adequate copyright notice. The issue is a simple one-does this prior pub*

Member of the New York Bar.
1. 233 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
2. 239 F. Supp. 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
3. Neither case considered the formalities required at the place of publication.
4. 242 F. Supp. 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
5. 233 F. Supp. at 261. See 17 U.S.C. § 19 (1964). Although the court did not discuss
the issue, no notice is required by Japanese law.
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lication abroad place the work in the public domain, preventing the later
acquisition of a valid copyright?"O'
The district court, relying heavily on a regulation of the Copyright
Office, 7 an old district court decision later disapproved in its circuit,' and
the Universal Copyright Convention,9 which is inapplicable to Americans
as to questions of American law, answered the question in the affirmative"0
and denied a preliminary injunction.
On a subsequent motion for summary judgment, the district court held
that, notwithstanding the plaintiff's legal arguments, there remained the
factual issue of good faith so that the motion had to be denied. The issue
of good faith was raised by the plaintiff's failure to disclose the prior
publication in Japan in the application for American registration. The
court indicated that if the plaintiff had not acted in good faith it would
be denied the equitable relief it sought."
In Lancer Books, the court denied a temporary injunction to the
plaintiff, the assignee of the rights of the authors of the recent best
selling book, "Candy." The book had been previously published in France
in 1958 in the English language. No ad interim protection had been
perfected. The book was published in the United States, with proper
notice, in 1964.
Although the opinion seems to turn on the ad interim provisions,"2 the
court indicated one of the contentions of the plaintiffs as follows:
[P]laintiffs took the position that ...the French edition of "Candy" which defendants
copied was not in the public domain because it had never been published without notice
of copyright in the United States. Inother words, their contention is that a book in the
English language by American authors which was published only in a foreign country is
not in the public domain, within the meaning of the United States copyright laws, and
at any time that the authors apply for registration of a United States copyright on that
book as revised, they secure United States copyright protection for the entire book, not
merely for the revisions. 13

The court rejected this contention and noted that no authority was
cited for this proposition.' 4
6. 233 F. Supp. at 262.
7. Id. at 262-63, quoting 37 C.F.R. § 202.2(a)(3) (1960).
8. 233 F. Supp. at 263, citing Basevi v. Edward O'Toole Co., 26 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y.
1939).
9. 233 F. Supp. at 262-63, citing Universal Copyright Convention of 1952, 17 U.S.C.
§ 9 (1964).
10. 233 F. Supp. at 263.

11.

242 F. Supp. at 880.

12.

239 F. Supp. at 783. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 22, 23 (1964).

13. 239 F. Supp. at 785.
14.

Ibid.
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It is submitted that both decisions are wrong, both as a construction
of the statute, and as a balance of the equities. It is further submitted
that a proper reading of the United States law requires that actions in
Japan, France, or in any other foreign place, have no effect as to the
United States copyright law. While the work may be dedicated in a foreign
country, deliberately, or inadvertently, or protected in a foreign country,
only action within the territory of the United States can invest or divest
American statutory protection.
It is beyond the scope of this inquiry to consider the relative merits of
notice requirements, manufacturing provisions, the ad interim provisions,
or what constitutes a general publication. Wherever necessary, general
publications shall be assumed and the manufacturing provisions considered inapplicable or satisfied.
II. Two ROUTES TO UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT
Section nine of the copyright law provides that authors or proprietors
shall have copyright "for the terms specified" and "under the conditions"
of the United States copyright law.15 This is the only route available to
citizens of the United States.1" The section specifies three provisos operative if the author or proprietor is not a citizen of the United States. 7
The first and second provisos merely expand the group entitled to
the protection of the United States laws, they do not alter the terms or
conditions of that protection. The first proviso includes aliens with
citizens if the alien was a United States domiciliary at the time of the
first publication of the work.18 The second proviso includes aliens with
citizens if the alien is a citizen or subject of a "proclaimed country'one which provides similar protection to the citizens of the United States."
This, then, is the first route to United States protection-compliance
with the provisions of the United States copyright law. It must be followed
by American nationals, American alien domiciliaries, and nationals of
proclaimed countries.
Judge Van Pelt Bryan recently granted a motion to dismiss. 251 F. Supp. 210 (S.D.N.Y.
1966). This is an anomalous result of the provision in the copyright law which disables a
plaintiff from bringing a lawsuit for infringement until there has been a registration. 17
U.S.C. § 13 (1964). Here, ad interim registration was denied pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 202.4(b)
(1960), due to the fact that the book was banned during the relevant time periods. The
Register's action is, however, being tested by mandamus.

15.

17 U.S.C. § 9 (1964).

16.
17.

Ibid.
17 US.C. §§ 9(a), (b), (c) (1964).

18. 17 U.S.C. § 9(a) (1964).
19.

17 U.S.C. § 9(b) (1964).
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The third proviso of section nine was enacted in 1954, and, along
with the Universal Copyright Convention, it became effective on September 16, 1955. The avowed purpose of this proviso was to amend the
United States law to the extent necessary to implement the Convention
which the United States had previously signed and ratified.2 While this
subsection, in the historic tradition of the United States copyright law,
has its murky aspects and presents certain difficulties of interpretation,
certain of its provisions are clear.
It should first be emphasized that this third proviso, as with the first
two, is only applicable to citizens or subjects of foreign states or nations.,'
The proviso exempts works to which it applies from certain requirements
of the United States copyright law, and substitutes, as conditions of the
exemption, the specific formalities permitted by the Convention. The
proviso is applicable to works of authors who are citizens or subjects of
Convention member nations and who first publish anywhere outside of
the United States; and to works of any non-domiciliary aliens first
published in Convention member nations other than the United States.
The Convention specifically denies preemption. 23 Thus, the proviso
implements the Convention by providing national treatment, United States
protection in the United States, for the works in question, conditioned only
upon compliance with the formalities of the Convention. 4
What the Convention sought to provide was a uniform and simple
method, an insured route, for obtaining protection throughout its member
nations. The thrust of subsection nine (c), even with certain textual
difficulties, is to allow certain non-resident aliens who comply with a
stated universal formality to enjoy copyright protection in the United
States notwithstanding non-compliance with certain requirements of
American law.
This, then, is the second route to United States copyright protectioncompliance with the special requirements of subsection nine (c). This does
not supercede the first two provisos, rather it eliminates certain require20. 17 U.S.C. § 9(c) (1964). The Convention provided for its own effectiveness three
months after deposit of twelve instruments of ratification, at least four of which had to
be from non-Berne Union countries. Universal Copyright Convention, art. IX, § 1, Sept. 6,
1952, 17 U.S.C. § 9 (1964).

21. See generally Latman, Howell's Copyright Law 185-90 (rev. ed. 1962).
22. This gives rise to the textual difficulty of the reference to citizens of the United States
found in the last paragraph of the subsection. See Nimmer, Copyright § 65.33, at 256-58
(1966).
23.

Universal Copyright Convention, arts. XVIII, XIX, Sept. 6, 1952, 17 U.S.C. § 9

(1964).
24.

17 U.S.C. § 9(c)

(1964).
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ments of the first route and provides an alternative route for those who
can invoke its aid.
Copyright Office Regulation section 202.2 (a) (3) provides that "works
first published abroad, other than works eligible for ad interim registration, must bear an adequate copyright notice at the time of their first
publication in order to secure copyright under the law of the United
States." 5
The Copyright Office view was that, prior to the enactment of the Convention amendments, 2 in accordance with the doctrine of Heim v. Universal Pictures Co.,27 registration of works first published abroad without

United States notice was of doubtful effect. The Office is of the view that
by enacting the Convention amendments, Congress had expressed its intention that in all cases of first publication abroad, works must bear the
United States notice if they are to enjoy United States protection.'
It is submitted that the regulation is an improper construction of the
statute generally, as will be discussed below, and that its reasoning is
inapt. Congress was certainly not addressing this question.
The Heim doctrine was addressed to copyright protection through the
first route. We have seen that the second route was enacted as an alternative, not as a replacement, and thus, to whatever degree it is correct,
Heim should have continuing application to protection secured or sought
through the first route. Thus, as a construction of subsection nine (c),
the regulation is wholly inapposite to the scope of that subsection.
Having seen that there are two routes to United States copyright
protection, the remainder of this article will be confined to the first, as
the second is a specialized alternative which is only available to a limited
group.
III.

THE UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT

IN

STATUTE

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The operation of the United States copyright statute, which transforms
so-called common law property right protection into statutory protection,
is centered around section ten of the copyright statute:
Any person entitled thereto by this title may secure copyright for his work by
publication thereof with the notice of copyright required by this title; and such
notice shall be affixed to each copy thereof published or offered for sale in the
25.
26.
27.
28.
(1959).

37 C.F.R. § 202.2(a) (3) (1960).
68 Stat. 1030 (1954), 17 US.C. § 9 (1964).
154 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1946).
See Cary, Proposed New Copyright Office Regulations, Copyright Soc'y 6 Bull. 213
Professor Cary is the Deputy Register of Copyrights.
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United States by authority of the copyright proprietor, except in the case of books
seeking ad interim protection under section 22 of this title.29

This section has remained substantially unchanged since its original enactment as section nine of the revision of 1909,80 the basic copyright statute.
The first clause of the section requires, in order to invest statutory protection, publication of the work with the requisite notice. The second
clause of the section mandates that the notice be inscribed on all copies
distributed in the United States. It is the view of this writer that what
the Congress intended to require by the first clause was a publication
in the United States with the requisite notice, and that the second clause
is a codification of United Dictionary Co. v. G. & C. Merriam Co." This
case had been decided by the Supreme Court just over one year before
the enactment of the 1909 revision, and it was certainly considered by
the draftsmen.
The first copyright statute, the Statute of Anne,82 was enacted by the
British Parliament in 1710. Although there was later to be much discussion as to whether a right of literary property had previously existed at
common law and whether such a right survived the statute, 3 Parliament
decided, after a long struggle with the booksellers of London, that a
limited statutory monopoly would be granted to authors. 1
Since its inception, the thrust of British copyright law has been to
make the work product of authors available to the British public by encouraging the publication and dissemination of their works in England
through provision for a profitable, though limited, author's monopoly."
Except for the effect of international agreements-Berne Union, Universal Convention, or individual bilateral treaties-England requires that
the work be first published in England if it is to be protected. 0 Such a
requirement reflects the Parliamentary purpose in enacting a copyright
statute, the public good of having the products of authors readily available to the people of England.
Prior to the adoption of the Constitution, the Continental Congress
adopted a resolution encouraging the several states to enact copyright
29. 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1964).
30. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 9, 35 Stat. 1077.
31. 208 US. 260 (1908).
32. 8 Anne, c. 19 (1709).
33. Donaldsons v. Becket, 4 Burr. 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (HIL. 1774).
34. See Morris, The Origins of the Statute of Anne, in ASCAP Copyright Law Symposium
No. 12, at 222 (1963).
35. Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H.L.C. 815, 10 Eng. Rep. 681 (1854).
36. Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 74, §§ 2(2)(a), 3(3)(a).
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legislation.3" Pursuant to this resolution, and with some prodding from
Noah Webster,3 twelve of the original thirteen states enacted copyright
legislation.39 The preamble of the first such statute, adopted by Connecticut, read: "Whereas it is perfectly agreeable to the principles of natural
equity and justice, that every author should be secured in receiving the
profits that may arise from the sale of his works, and such security may
encourage men of learning and genius to publish their writings; which
may do honor to their country, and service to mankind .. ."4 The authors of our earliest legislation had in view the same values to be derived
from copyright protection-publication and availability to the publicas did their English cousins. But, publication where?
The union existing under the Articles of Confederation was that of
thirteen sovereigns, and, in the days of the founding of our nation, economic necessity and technological change had not yet required the dilution of the sovereignty of individual states. State sovereignty was more
jealously guarded than it is at present.4 It is, then, not surprising that
five states specifically prescribed the monopoly to exist for a term commencing upon the first publication of the work in their own state.42 In
addition, five statutes specifically provided remedies in the state courts
if an insufficient number of copies were made available in the state, or if
the price charged for copies within the state was unreasonable; and
one state required, as a condition of copyright, that copies of the work
be deposited in a specified library within the state." Thus, of the twelve
states which enacted legislation, eight specifically required, as a condition
of copyright, dissemination of the work within their own boundaries.
The remaining four statutes did not specifically embody a different view,
but were merely, like our present federal statute, silent on this point In
37.

24 Journals, Continental Congress 326 (1783).

38. Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., Study No. 3 on Copyright Law Revision 69 n.22
(Comm. Print 1961).
39. These states were Connecticut, Georgia, Massachusetts, Maryland, New Jersey, New
Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, South Carolina
and Virginia. U.S. Copyright Office, Bull. No. 3, Copyright Enactments 1-21 (rev. ed.
1963). This is a compilation of all United States copyright enactments revised through 1962.
40. Id. at 1.
41. See M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
42. Connecticut, Georgia, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania had such provisions. US. Copyright Office, Bull. No. 3, Copyright Enactments at 2, 7, 10, 17, 19

(rev. ed. 1963).
43. Connecticut, Georgia, North Carolina, New York, and South Carolina were the
states which provided such remedies. Id. at 2-3, 13, 16, 18, 20.
44. This state was Massachusetts. Id. at 4.
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view of the position taken by the states which did speak to the point, it
is likely that a local court in a mute state, if called on to construe publication, would have read it to require publication within the state in
question. But, the adoption of the Constitution and the enactment shortly
thereafter of the first federal copyright law rendered issues of state construction moot as to statutory or post-publication copyright.
The drafters of the Constitution included in the description of the
powers of Congress contained in article I, the power "To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries ....

The Constitutional Convention adopted the view, established in England some eighty years before and then existing in twelve states, that
the public good is to be served in making available the writings of authors, and that this good is best secured through the device of granting a
limited monopoly to the proprietors of the works, thus encouraging them
to publish. This is the understanding placed upon the constitutional purpose by the Supreme Court.45a
This constitutional provision was implemented almost immediately
by the enactment, at the second session of the first Congress of the
United States, of the first copyright act.4"
The original copyright procedure gave any citizen or resident author
the sole right of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending, for the term
specified, if he complied with the following requirements: (1) deposit,
before publication, of a printed copy of the title of the work in the office
of the clerk of the district court where the author resided; (2) publication of the clerk's certificate for four weeks, within two months of deposit
of title, in a newspaper printed in the United States; and, (3) delivery,
within six months of publication, of a copy of the work to the Secretary
of State.47 Certainly these requirements do not, on their face, indicate
that a publication outside of the United States was envisioned by the
Congress. The amendment of 180248 added a fourth requirement-that
the clerk's certificate be inserted in full on the title page or the page immediately following. 4 This was the beginning of the American copyright
notice. A shorter form of notice was provided for maps and charts.60
45.
45a.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, §§ 3, 4, 1 Stat. 125.
Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171.
Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 1, 2 Stat. 171.
Ibid.
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That the purpose of Congress was to provide an incentive for authors
to make their writings available within the United States is further born
out by the first provision of the 1790 act. In granting one term of copyright to books previously published, the grant was restricted to authors
of works already printed within these United States."1
Protection for non-resident aliens was specifically disavowed.12 This
disavowal was intended to permit American entrepreneurs to import
copies of foreign works, or to reprint them in America, thus furthering
the public good of having the greatest possible number of works available to Americans.
In 1831, the newspaper publication requirement was abandoned and
copies were to be deposited with the district courts for forwarding to
the Secretary of State." As of 1870, copies were to be deposited with the
Librarian of Congress.5" These were the formalities required prior to the
revision of 1909. Failure to comply with any of the formalities was fatal
to the copyright.55
The purpose of copyright remained unchanged in the eyes of the 1909
draftsmen of the 1909 revision," although the mechanics were to be
somewhat altered. Chairman Currier of the House Committee on Patents,
in the now famous Report No. 2 2 2 2 ,5" described the purpose of Congress quite clearly:
The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the author has in his writings, for the
Supreme Court has held that such rights as he has are purely statutory rights, but
upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be served and progress of science
and useful arts will be promoted by securing to authors for limited periods the
exclusive rights to their writings. The Constitution does not establish copyrights, but
provides that Congress shall have the power to grant such rights if it thinks best.
Not primarily for the benefit of the author, but primarily for the benefit of the
public, such rights are given. Not that any particular class of citizens, however worthy,
may benefit, but because the policy is believed to be for the benefit of the great
body of people, in that it58 will stimulate writing and invention, to give some bonus
to authors and inventors.

It is submitted that if the monopoly granted could have been secured
by compliance with the prepublication formalities and perfected by
51. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124.
52. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 5, 1 Stat. 125.
53. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 4, 4 Stat. 437.
54. Rev. Stat. § 4956 (1875).
55. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
56.

Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075.

57. H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909).
58. Id. at 7.
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publication, observing notice formalities, in a foreign place, it would have
thwarted the major purpose of the Constitution and the Congress, a
purpose which had remained unchanged throughout our history. Wherever
Congress used the word publication without specifying the place of
publication, it was saying, albeit sub silentio, publication in the United
States. This is especially the case in that, at this time, the economic situation, the state of international copyright relations and the nature of copyrightable work made it unlikely that a resident American author would
publish his book in a foreign country.
The English statute requires a first publication in England. It can be
argued that Congress, in refusing to require a first publication in the
United States, was willing to leave the door open to a later investitive
publication in the United States, but hardly that that first publication
abroad would itself invest the protection in the United States.
In addition, if the first publication abroad were to invest copyright in
the United States, each day which followed would shorten the term of
protection here and thereby decrease the economic motivation which
might stimulate a publication in the United States. This, again, would
be in contravention of the avowed purpose of the Constitution and the
Congress.
A further demonstration that by its use of the term publication Congress meant publication within the United States can be found in the
amendments to the copyright law made in 1891.11 It is in these amendments that we find the only specific reference to first publication abroad,
a reference which lasted only eighteen years.
Section 4956 of the Revised Statutes, as originally enacted in 1873,
was a codification of the prior requirements for securing copyright:
No person shall be entitled to a copyright unless he shall, before publication,
deliver at the office of the Librarian of Congress . . . a printed copy of the title
of the book or other article . . . nor unless he shall also, within ten days from the
publication thereof, deliver at the office of the Librarian of Congress . . . two copies
of such copyright book or other article . . .6

In the 1880's pressure for some form of recognition and protection for
foreign authors, and reciprocity for American authors in foreign lands,
reached its peak. Congress reacted by passage of the Act of March 3,
1891.1 The purpose of this act can be found in its section thirteen, the
precursor of the present section 9. Section 13 stated:
59. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 565, 26 Stat. 1106.
60. Rev. Stat. § 4956 (1875).
61. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 565, 26 Stat. 1106.
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That this act shall only apply to a citizen or subject of a foreign state or nation

when such foreign state or nation permits to citizens of the United States of America

the benefit of copyright on substantially the same basis as its own citizens; or when

such foreign state or nation is a party to an international agreement which provides
for reciprocity in the granting of copyright, by the terms of which agreement the
United States of America may, at its pleasure, become a party to such agreement. The
existence of either of the conditions aforesaid shall be determined by the President of
the United States by proclamation made from time to time as the purposes of this
62
act may require.

Thus, the first route of protection was now made available to citizens of
other countries.
Section three of this act amended section 4956 of the Revised Statutes
to read:
No person shall be entitled to a copyright unless he shall, on or before the day

of the publication in this or any foreign country, deliver at the office of the Librarian
of Congress . . . a printed copy of the title of the book . . . nor unless he shall
also, not later than the day of publication thereof in this or any foreign country,
deliver at the office of the Librarian of Congress . . . two copies of such copyright
book .... 63

While it might be argued that this is a directive to American proprietors
who might choose to publish abroad first, it is submitted that this was
not the intention of Congress. Rather, provision was being made to make
American copyright available on a reciprocal basis to foreign proprietors-individuals who would most likely first publish in their home
countries. The probability of an American author first publishing abroad
was still small and was probably not considered.
The most important observation, concerning the 1891 amendment, is
that when Congress wished to provide requirements with respect to
foreign publications, it did so specifically, and not by implication. The
silence of the 1909 act with respect to foreign publications should, therefore, be viewed not as an oversight-a gap to be filled by the courts--but
rather as a deliberate return to the pre-1891 requirement of publication
within the United States.
Brief attention should also be given to section 8 of the present law,
originally section 7 of the 1909 revision." The portion of that section
relevant to this discussion has remained virtually unchanged since its
enactment:
[N]o copyright shall subsist in the original text of any workwhich is in the public
domain, or in any work which was published in this country or any foreign country
62.
63.

Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 565, § 13, 26 Stat. 1110.
Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 565, § 3, 26 Stat. 1107.

64. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 7, 35 Stat. 1077.
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prior to the going into effect of this Act and has not been already copyrighted in the
United States .... e5

Reading this section together with the prior law, section 4956 of the
Revised Statutes, further indicates Congressional ability to refer to
foreign publications specifically and to understand the consequences of
the reference when made.
In sum, the first clause of section ten of the present law should be
read to say publication in the United States. American copyright protection cannot be invested by anything less, since to permit foreign publication to invest American copyright must be in contravention of the
constitutional mandate and the congressional purpose.
IV.

CONSTRUCTION OF THE COPYRIGHT STATUTE

It is a general rule of statutory construction that statutes will be construed to confine their effects to the territorial confines of the jurisdiction
of the enacting legislature. " 'All legislation is prima facie territorial.' "Go"
The canon of construction which teaches that legislation of Congress, unless a
contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States . . . is a valid approach whereby unexpressed congressional intent
may be ascertained. It is based on the assumption that Congress is primarily con-

cerned with domestic conditions. 67

Thus, "the copyright laws of one country have no extraterritorial operation, unless otherwise provided."6
Such construction reenforces our earlier explorations. Certainly the
Congress by its silence could not be construed to inflict burdens upon
actions taken without the jurisdiction of the United States. While Congress could require certain action to be taken without the United States,
its purpose would have to be clear. Congress' function is generally to
provide law regulating conduct within the United States.
So far it has been demonstrated that a proper construction of the act
would preclude a foreign publication from investing copyright through
the first route. But, if the foreign publication does not invest the copyright, does it, then, divest the American common law right? Does the
foreign publication make it impossible ever to invest the American protection? General publication in the United States terminates the com65. Ibid. The committee report describes the purpose of this clause, "to make it clear
that the original text of any work which has fallen into the public domain can not be
copyrighted." H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1909).
66. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909).
67. Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949). (Citation omitted.)

68. American Code Co. v. Bensinger, 282 Fed. 829, 833 (2d Cir. 1922).
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mon law right so that, if statutory protection has not commenced, all
rights are gone.69 It is then said that the work is in the public domain.
There are three possible views of the effect of a general foreign publication upon the American common law right. The first, and the harshest,
is that if the foreign publication does not comply with American statutory
formalities, it will constitute a dedication for the purpose of American
law. Such a view assumes, of course, that the foreign publication could
have been investitive. This is the view taken by the district court in
Ross Prods.
A middle view is that no divestiture will occur if the publication does
not serve to dedicate the work in the country of publication. This view,
the one taken by the court in Heim, also assumes that the foreign publication is investitive, but does not require it to comply with American
formalities.
The third view, the view of this writer, is that the foreign publication
is totally inoperative-it neither invests statutory protection nor divests
common law rights.
It has already been shown that section 8 of the present statute70 indicates that American statutory protection cannot be had for a work in
the public domain. The three views stated above can therefore be reduced
to the question, which publication will place the work in the public domain, foreign publication which does not satisfy American formalities,
foreign publication which does not satisfy formalities of the locus of
publication, or neither?
Each and every definition of the public domain, or its Latin forebear,
the publicijuris, can be reduced to one simple phrase-the common property of the entire state. 1 The word "public," used as an adjective, is always defined and restricted by sovereignties. Section 8, then, when
referring to the public domain was referring to the common property of
all the citizens of the United States.
It is quite clear that a work can be in the public domain in one country
and protected by copyright in another. This was true of all foreign works
in the United States until 1891. It is probably true of works of Americans today which may be protected in the United States although unprotected in other countries of the world, the U.S.S.R. for example. Also, the
term of copyright protection varies from place to place.
69. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
70. 17 U.S.C. § 8 (1964).
71. See Black, Law Dictionary 571 (4th ed. 1951); Webster. New International Dictionary
1836 (3d ed. 1961).
72. Ibid.
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That the public domain is a territorial concept seems to be the view
of the Supreme Court of the United States. In Ferris v. Frohman,73 the
court recognized one individual to be the owner of the English common
law rights and another to be the owner of American common law rights,
indicating that they are, indeed, separate packages. Thus, a general
publication of a work in a foreign country should have no effect upon the
American common law right. The only act which will divest the American
common law right is the general publication of the work in America to
the American people-what the courts euphemistically refer to as a
dedication. It is at that point that statutory copyright must be invested
if protection is to remain.
V. THE CASE LAW UNDER THE COPYRIGHT STATUTES
The search for authorities is not generously rewarded. As can be understood readily, the physical distance between the United States and
Europe made this issue unimportant until the late nineteenth century.
Today, in view of the closeness of the entire world, the question of the
effect of foreign actions has become of increasing significance.
The economic proximity of England and the continent of Europe,
however, has been great for many centuries, and it is in the English reporters that the first case law is found. The English Statute of Anne, the
model for a great part of the original American statute, initially provided
that protection would commence upon publication, and it required formalities much the same as did the later American statute-deposit of
title, copies, and the like. In the initial statute, the word publication
was not expressly modified to mean British publication as it is today.
Early in the nineteenth century the question arose whether a French
author had secured British protection by a publication in France. In
Clementi v. Walker, 4 the British court had this to say:
.[T]he British Legislature must be supposed to have legislated with a view to
British interests and the advancement of British learning ....
Without very clear
words, therefore, to shew an intention to extend the privilege to foreign publications,
I should think it must be confined to books printed in this kingdom, and instead of
there being any such clear words to shew that intention, there are provisions which
strongly imply the latter. The provisions directing that the authors of books generally
shall have the sole right of printing and reprinting, and that before publication the
title shall be entered, and copies delivered at Stationers' Hall, evidently contemplate
a British, not a foreign publication. 75
73.

223 U.S. 424 (1912).

74. 2 B. & C. 861, 107 Eng. Rep. 601 (K.B. 1824).
75. Id. at 867-68, 107 Eng. Rep. at 604. (Emphasis added.)
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Shortly thereafter, in Chappell v. Purday T ' another British court held
that a foreigner had no common law rights since they could not arise
until there had been some connection with England.
The result of these cases was that a first publication abroad by a
foreigner would be fatal for English protection since it did not invest
British copyright and the work could be published in England with impunity. The foreign author had no common law rights on which to base
his complaints. Since anyone could import the foreign print of the work,
the courts held that no one could have a copyright in it.
The question of the common law copyrights of foreigners reached the
English House of Lords in 1854." The issue was somewhat muddied by
the assignment of the copyright of the author, an Italian, to an Italian
publisher, who then assigned the British rights to an English party. The
case was referred to the judges of the law courts who rendered advisory
opinions to the Lords. A majority of the judges felt that the assignee who
first published in England had a good copyright in the work. There had
been no prior publication anywhere else.
The House of Lords, following the Clementi and Chappell cases,
adopted the position of the minority of the judges. The Lords held that the
second assignee could not have anything more than the original assignor
had to assign. The Italian author had never gone to England or done anything else which might have satisfied the Lords. Since the Italian author
had no English common law rights, he could assign none. Accordingly,
there were no rights to be invested by publication of the work in England.
Once the work became generally available in England, anyone could
print it.
In dictum there was unanimous agreement that, had there been a prior
publication in Italy, there could not have been an English copyright. All
the judges cited Chappell, which held that foreigners do not have common law rights.
The result of these early British cases was that the word publication
did indeed mean publicationin England. This lends added support to the
argument that the word publication in American copyright statutes since
1783 has meant publication within the United States. In addition, the
divestitive effect of a first foreign publication was considered for the first
time. The basis for this dictum was the refusal of the courts, at that
time, to recognize that a foreigner could have common law rights and
protection in England unless he came into England and became personally subject to her laws.
76.
77.

14 M. & W. 303, 153 Eng. Rep. 491 (Ex. 1845).
Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H.L.C. 815, 10 Eng. Rep. 681 (1854).

492

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

There was, however, much dissent to this theory. Many felt that a
friendly alien should be able to resort to the courts of a country and
protect his rights whether he was in the country before or afterward.
There was, of course, little authority at that time for either proposition.
But a majority of the judges adhered to this latter view, and they referred to libel cases to support their view.
The first American court to deal with the effect of a first foreign publication was the New York Court of Appeals. The plaintiff, in Palmer v.
De Witt,7 8 was the assignee of the American rights in a British play.
The play, which had never been printed, had been performed both in
England and in New York, and the defendant was printing it in New
York. The court held for the plaintiff, saying that the performance of
the play in New York was not a general publication and that the performance of the play in England, although a publication there, did not
divest the American common law right.79 The court assumed that there
was such a thing as an American common law right which could be
segregated from the English right, thus supporting the view that the
common law and the public domain are territorial concepts.
The case has been cited for the proposition that had there been something in England that would constitute a general publication under American law, then the American rights would have been lost. This issue was
not, however, before the court. What is usually cited is a dictum by Judge
Allen to the effect that a publication in England may result in the loss
of American common law rights. For this proposition, Judge Allen cited
the House of Lords opinion in Jeflerys v. Boosey70 a pointing out that that
case was decided against the opinion of six of the ten judges of the law
courts and indicating that the case might not be the law in England at
all." The court, thus, went out of its way to question the only authority
on point.
In the later case of Carte v. Duff,8 ' there had been an attempt to secure
some form of American protection by Gilbert and Sullivan. They engaged
an American to come to London and make a piano score of the unpublished complete score of the Mikado. The American's piano score was
then registered in Washington and the libretto, vocal score, and American piano score were then published in England. The defendant purchased
the available material in England and hired his own orchestrator to make
78.
79.
79a.
80.
81.

47 N.Y. 532 (1872).
Id. at 542-43.
4 H.L.C. 815, 10 Eng. Rep. 681 (1854).
Id. at 540-41.
25 Fed. 183 (C.CS.D.N.Y. 1885).
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a full score of the operetta. The defendant then produced the operetta in
the United States. The plaintiff was the assignee of the American presentation rights from Gilbert and Sullivan and of the registered American
piano score.
The court decided the case on a very narrow issue and found for the
defendant. At this time, there were no performance rights in music, only
in dramatic works.8 2 The court felt that the piano score itself was not
a dramatic work and, whether or not the copyright was valid, there had
not been any infringement.
While it is much to be regretted that our statutes do not, like the English statutes,

protect the author or proprietor in all the uses to which literary property may be
legitimately applied, it is not the judicial function to supply the defect. In view of these
conclusions, it is not necessary to consider whether a valid statutory copyright for
the piano-forte arrangement . . . has been obtained, or whether there was a noncompliance in any particulars with the statutory requisites. These questions may
is made to infringe the copyright by an
be more properly reserved until an attempt
83
unauthorized multiplication of copies.

Despite its narrow holding, the court made rather broad pronouncements in an unsupported dictum earlier in the opinion, and it is for
these pronouncements that the case is now cited.
Common-law rights of authors run only to the time of the publication of their
manuscripts with their consent.... It is immaterial whether the publication be made
in one country or another. Such rights of authors as are saved by statute are not
recognized extraterritorially. They can only be enforced in the sovereignty of their
84

origin.

No authority was cited for these propositions and the court did not discuss the possibility of infringement of the common law right which might
still have existed in the remainder of the operetta which had not been
included in the piano score.
As performing rights in music were not recognized, the court's narrow
holding was correct under the then existing law. In addition, plaintiff
apparently did not allege infringement of his common law rights. This
is no basis, however, for holding that rights in the United States were
lost by extraterritorial publication.
In passing, a word should be said about McLoughlin v. Raphael Tuck
Co.s5 There, the issue before the court was the criminality, in the United
States, of affixing a fraudulent American notice to copies manufactured
82.

Music performance rights were first recognized by the Act of January 6, 1897,

29 Stat. 481.
83. 25 Fed. at 187.
84. Id. at 184.
85. 191 U.S. 267 (1903).
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abroad for import into the United States. The relevant section of the
law86 provided a penalty for false notices. Prior to 1897, the penalty
was for impressing the false notice, without indication of where the false
notice was impressed. After 1897, a penal provision was provided for the
importation of copies with false notices.8 7 This case arose prior to 1897
and the false notices were impressed in Europe. The Court found for the
defendant and stated that "penal provisions of the law had no extraterritorial operation, and therefore did not embrace the act of affixing in
a foreign country to a publication a false statement that it was copyrighted under the laws of the United States." '
While the analogy between criminal sanctions and copyright protection
is somewhat remote, there is some validity in urging that this holding is
merely another demonstration of the understanding of territoriality in
our law, both as to duties, sanctions and rights.
United Dictionary Co. v. G. & C. Merriam Co."" is the only decision
by our highest court that deals with an aspect of the notice provision
on a foreign publication. There had been a publication with notice in
the United States and an authorized later publication of the same work
in England, without the American notice. The Court held that the subsequent publication abroad, without notice, did not forfeit the American
copyright.
While the case is not directly on point, the language of Justice Holmes
is relevant as a view of the problem.
Of course, Congress could attach what conditions it saw fit to its grant, but it is
unlikely that it would make requirements of personal action beyond the sphere of its
control. Especially is it unlikely that it would require a warning to the public against
the infraction of a law beyond the jurisdiction where that law was in force. The
reasons for doing so have not grown less, yet in the late statute giving copyright for
foreign publications the notice is necessary only in "all copies of such books sold or
distributed in the United States." . . . So it is decided that the section punishing a
false notice, which naturally would be coextensive with the requirement of notice,

did not extend to false statements affixed abroad. McLoughlin v. Raphael Tuck Co...
The same conclusion would follow from the form prescribed for the notice, which
would be inapt in foreign lands.90

Holmes concluded that the Court was "satisfied that the statute does not
require notice of the American copyright on books published abroad and
sold only for use there ......
86.

Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 565, § 6, 26 Stat. 1109.

87. Act of March 3, 1897, ch. 392, § 1, 29 Stat. 694.
88.
89.
90.

191 U.S. at 270.
208 U.S. 260 (1908).
Id. at 264. (Citation omitted.)

91. Id. at 266.
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Holmes was dealing with a slightly different question, yet his remarks,
are relevant on a much broader scale. Applied to the question of foreign
investitive publication, his reasoning would dictate that publication in the
United States was intended. In addressing the question of divestitive
foreign publications, he found that notice provisions were for the protection of Americans. The presence or absence of a notice in a foreign publication should be a matter of indifference, in the absence of a specific
Congressional directive.
Ferrisv. Frohman9 2 is generally considered the leading case supporting
the proposition that foreign publications without notice are divestitive
of American common law rights. Once again, however, the case is, at
best, somewhat ambiguous and can as easily be read for the opposite
proposition. The issue was the validity of an American registration of
a play which had been performed in England prior to publication and
registration in the United States. The Supreme Court held it valid, although it recognized that the performance of a play is a publication under
British law and would put the play in the public domain there if statutory
protection did not invest. The Court held that the play was not in the
public domain in the United States, regardless of its status in England.
In dealing with the question of what is publication, the Court said that
the "present case is not one in which the owner of a play has printed
and published it and thus, having lost his rights at common law, must
depend upon statutory copyright in this country. "3 While this is the
language usually cited for the divestitive effect of foreign publications,
it is certainly not unambiguous. Was the Court thinking about foreign
publications, or was it merely talking to a definition of publication? One
cannot be certain. The most telling point in the opinion is the Court's
tacit recognition of the territoriality of the common law. The Court is
not troubled by the possibility of the work being dedicated in one nation
and protected in another. The Court recognizes this as a fact of territoriality and governs its opinion accordingly. Thus, if anything is to
be learned from Frohman, it is the territoriality of the common law, and
the result of such territoriality is that dedication can only occur on a
country-by-country basis.
The plaintiff in Universal Film Mfg. Co. v. Copperman" was the assignee of the rights of a Danish film corporation to a Danish silent movie.
The Danish company had sold prints of the film throughout Europe with
92. 223 U.S. 424 (1912).
93. Id. at 434.
94. 212 Fed. 301 (S.).N.Y.),
(1914).

aff'd, 218 Fed. 577 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 235 U.S. 704
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a proviso in each contract of sale to the effect that the film was not to
be used outside the country of sale. Defendant purchased one of the
films from a European vendee of the Danish film company in Europe,
without knowledge of any restrictions, and showed it in the United States.
Judge Hough, in the district court, held flatly that the publication of the
film in Europe prior to investation of copyright in the United States required a ruling for the defendant. "Because ... there was a publication
in Europe before registration in the United States, this bill must be dismissed."95 It is this proposition in the district court opinion which makes
its way into later cases. The Second Circuit affirmed, but on a different
theory. The appellate court reasoned that the copyright was valid. The
restrictions put on the individual vendees were ineffectual and the licenses granted to purchasers by the Danish company were entirely consistent with the American copyright. The defendant was licensed to perform the copyrighted picture in the United States and the plaintiff's
copyright could not be used to repudiate the defendants' prior license.
Although Judge Hough had been clear that the showing of the films
on a wide scale basis in Europe had divested common law rights there,
even as to this the Second Circuit disagreed. "The Nordisk Company
abandoned its common-law property in the United States when it took
out the statutory copyright."9
In any event, the case does not stand for divestiture, rather, although
not clearly articulated in the circuit court opinion, it indicates, again, the
territoriality of copyright in that an American right could be and could
support a statutory registration.
The Second Circuit's opinion in Copperman made a strong impression
upon Judge Hough, for when faced with another instance of foreign
publication, his views had changed. In Italian Book Co. v. Cardill9 7 an
Italian song had been published in Italy in 1913 without any American
copyright notice. The plaintiff was the assignee of the American rights in
the song and he published the work with notice in the United States in
1918. Without citing Copperman, Judge Hough, considering the case one
of first impression, held that the prior Italian publication did not prevent
American copyright. The court was silent as to the commencement of the
term of copyright although there is a reference to the application for
registration indicating 1913 as the year of first publication. 8
95.
96.
97.
98.

212 Fed. at 304.
218 Fed. at 580. (Emphasis added.)
273 Fed. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1918).
Ibid.
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The whole line of cases, holding that publication without copyrighting destroys
the right to a subsequent copyright, are either founded on statutes differing from
the present one, or on a proven publication in the country of the court rendering the
decision. It seems to me as a matter of first impression that the publication in Italy
was, by the terms of the notice printed or stamped on each copy sold, limited to
Italy, and did not (in the absence of statutory prohibition) prevent the subsequent
American copyright, if (as is the case here) there had been no publication in the
United States prior to that of the copyright owner.9

This language leaves room for some discussion. If Judge Hough, in
discussing prior cases, was referring to prior American statutes, as he
probably was, this further indicates that Congress specifically provided
for foreign publications where it saw fit to do so. In addition, although
there was no clear explanation of the Italian notice which restricted the
publication to Italy, it has been our thesis that such a publication should
be territorially restricted in this manner.
This case was decided upon uncertain ground. Yet, Judge Hough
resolved the doubt so as to avoid causing a forfeiture and thereby benefiting a pirate. Certainly, this is the way to tip the scale.
In a later case, both the plaintiff and defendant were pirates. Plaintiff
had copied, with certain minor editing, an older, previously published,
English code book. Defendant copied plaintiff's edition and claimed that
plaintiff had nothing to copyright. The sole issue in the case, American
Code Co. v. Bensinger,'" was whether the whole or any part of the
plaintiff's edition was copyrightable. The Second Circuit, with Judge
Hough sitting as a member of the panel, affirmed a temporary injunction
and remanded the case for trial.
Once again, the language most often cited from the opinion is dictum,
and ambiguous dictum at that.
If a British author, upon publication in England, copyrights his book in that
country, the copyright protects him in that country; but, unless he has also copyrighted the work in the United States, his English copyright affords him no protection
against anyone who brings out in this country a piratical edition of the work. The
copyright laws of one country have no extraterritorial operation, unless otherwise
provided. Ferris v. Frohman. .....01

The court was not referring to a possible claim of infringement of
common law fights in the United States and its language is quite loose.
It is hard to believe that Judge Hough would concur in such an opinion,
only four years after his decision in Cardilli, if that issue had been
squarely presented. In any event, the language is dictum, reinforcing
99. Id. at 620.
100.

101.

282 Fed. 829 (2d Cir. 1922).
Id. at 833.
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a territorial understanding of copyright protection, and pointing itself to
a question of divestiture, not toward investiture.
There was a seventeen year hiatus before these questions were considered again. Then, in Basevi v. Edward O'Toole Co., 0 2 it was held, for
the first time, that a first foreign publication, without American notice,
was fatal to American rights. The language of Judge Woolsey is unmistakable. "[T]he publication of a book . . .in a foreign country, without
notice of United States copyright thereon, will prevent the owner of the
book from subsequently securing a valid copyright thereof in the United
States." 0 3
Judge Woolsey cited the district court opinion in Copperman, American
Code, The Mikado Case, and, with a "c.f.," Frohman. As has been
pointed out above, these cases can hardly be said to be authority for this
broad proposition. His discussion of Cardilliis interesting.
The case of Italian Book Co. v. Cardili ... cited by the plaintiff's counsel, must,
I think, be regarded as having been overruled by the Circuit Court of Appeals in the
Bensinger Case to which I have just referred. Furthermore, I find by looking up
the Cardilli Case in Shepard's Citations that it has never been cited or followed in
any reported case. I think, therefore, that it cannot any longer be regarded as an
authority. It is a satisfaction to me to reach this conclusion, as, in view of our law,
I have not been able to understand the rationale of Judge Hough's decision in that
case.104

Considering the fact that the issue had not been specifically raised
since the Cardillicase, it is not surprising that Judge Hough had not been
cited. A look at today's citator shows that neither Judge Hough nor
Judge Woolsey is cited again until Heim in 1946. Both opinions are then
cited again for the first time, on this point, in Ross Products, in 1964.
Little more than general disagreement with Judge Woolsey can be
voiced, except to point out that his cases are not really authorities for
his proposition. In any event, the Second Circuit has refused to follow
his lead.
Heim v. UniversalPictures Co. 05 is the first case to state that a foreign
publication, without American notice, will invest American copyright, so
long as the publication does not divest copyright at the place of publication. Judge Frank's construction is a new view of copyright. All prior
cases had, with the exception of Basevi, shied away from permitting a
foreign publication to divest American protection, or had specifically
102.
103.
104.
105.

26 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
Id. at 46.
Ibid. (Citation omitted.)
154 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1946).
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held that they did not divest protection. No one before had suggested that
a foreign publication without an American notice would invest the statutory protection in the United States.
We construe the statute, as to a publication in a foreign country by a foreign author
(i.e., as to a publication described in the 1914 amendment), not to require, as a

condition of obtaining or maintaining a valid American copyright, that any notice
be affixed to any copies whatever published in such foreign country, regardless of
whether publication first occurred in that country or here, or whether it occurred
before or after registration here. 10 6

It is submitted that Judge Frank has turned section ten inside out.
The discussion above has shown that the proviso limiting the requirement of the notice to works published in the United States was probably
a codification of the United Dictiouzry case. The thrust of that case was
that once copyright had been secured by publication with notice in the
United States, a publication abroad which did not bear the notice would
not divest the American protection. To reason that notice is absolutely
waived for an investitive foreign publication is wholly at odds with the
first clause of section ten which provides that copyright will be secured
by a publication with notice. Also, as has been argued before, to permit
a foreign publication to invest protection is to thwart the purpose of the
Constitution and of Congress.
Whether Judge Frank would be followed by another circuit, the
Supreme Court, or even the Second Circuit today, is not known. Even
Judge Clark, in concurring, expressed dismay at Judge Frank's views. 107
Nonetheless, Heirm is in the books and must be considered in discussing
this area.
The decision is certainly liberal in its view of forfeiture. Perhaps this
flows from Judge Hough's opinion in Cardilli. But, it is submitted that
Heim is wrong in its understanding of the basic purpose of copyright in
the United States and that it should not be followed. 08
Apparently Justice McNally, sitting in the New York Supreme Court,
was not impressed with the Heim decision. In a terse opinion which barely
states the facts of the case, Hill & Range Songs, Inc. v. London Records,
Inc., °9 he said that "whatever common-law rights the plaintiff might have
had prior thereto terminated with the publication of the music and lyric,
0
although the publication thereof occurred abroad.""
106.
107.

Id. at 486. (Footnote omitted.)
Id. at 488.

108. The case has, however, been cited with apparent although questioning approval
in Mills Music, Inc. v. Cromwell Music, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 54, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
109.

142 N.Y.S.2d 311 (Sup. Ct. 1955).

110. Id. at 312.
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Justice McNally, although a kindred spirit of Judge Woolsey, does not
cite him. Neither does he cite Judge Frank nor Judge Hough. His authorities for this proposition are Frohman, which is hardly an authority for
this proposition, three cases"'. which did not involve foreign publications
but held that a general publication here will divest common law rights
(a proposition which is not questioned), and O'Neill v. General Film
Co.," 2 which held that the filing of copies of a play in England with the
Lord Chamberlain, a requisite to obtaining a license to perform the play,
and the performance of the play, did not divest American common law
rights. The New York appellate division had indicated, by way of dictum
in O'Neill, that American protection might be divested through acts in
England. For this proposition the appellate division cited Frohman and
Palmer v. De Witt.
Curiously, in Hill & Range Songs, Inc., Justice McNally did not cite
his strongest authority, Basevi, and did not make any attempt to distinguish Heim. At best his decision fails to discuss all the authorities and
is the decision of a state court not often concerned with copyright questions.
One more district court opinion, Rolland v. Henry Holt & Co.,"'
produced dictum to the effect that foreign publications can be divestitive.
Here, no issue of copyright infringement was raised, but rather, some form
of action founded on an implied contract was alleged.
In any event, the court's dictum does not give any weight to Heim.
"Publication unprotected by United States copyright releases a work
for copying; it is then dedicated to the public and the author's common
law rights no longer protect the work against duplication."'1 4 So far, so
good. But then, Judge Walsh went on to state that "in this respect
publication abroad has the same effect as publication here.""'
He cited American Code, Copperman, The Mikado Case, Basevi and
Palmer v. De Witt. With each succeeding case the dicta are compounded
and broader and more authoritative language is produced.
A recent decision of the Second Circuit, Beechwood Music Corp. v.
Vee Jay Records, Inc.,"6 is also worthy of some attention. The plaintiff
iii. Soci6 Des Films Menchen v. Vitagraph Co. of America, 251 Fed. 258 (2d Cir.
1918); Photo-Drama Motion Picture Co. v. Social Uplift Film Corp., 220 Fed. 448 (2d
Cir. 1915); Jewelers' Mercantile Agency v. Jewelers' Weekly Pub. Co., 155 N.Y. 241, 49
N.E. 872 (1898).

112.
113.

171 App. Div. 854, 157 N.Y. Supp. 1028 (Ist Dep't 1916).
152 F. Supp. 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).

114.
115.
116.

Id. at 168.
Ibid.
328 F.2d 728 (2d Cir. 1964).
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had licensed others to record certain music in England, the music being
previously registered in the United States. The defendant made recordings
of the music in the United States and the plaintiff sued for infringement.
Defendant urged that the compulsory license provisions" 7 applied although the licensed recording was made in England. The court, stating
that "'rules of United States statutory law

. . .

apply only to conduct

occurring within, or having effects within, the territory of the United
States, unless the contrary is clearly indicated by the statute,' '"'Irejected
this argument.
It seems that the importation of English recordings into the United
States would have the same effect within the United States as the importation of English published books or Italian works of art or whatever.
The court said, "although Ferris v. Frohman . . .dealt with a different

claim of extraterritorial application of the Copyright Act, it points
strongly against defendants' view.""' 9 Has not the Second Circuit read
Frokman as has been suggested above?
No mention is made of the issue of whether the production or wide
dissemination of phonograph recordings is a publication under United
States law," ° since the composition had already been registered in the
United States. The indication seems to be that if the Second Circuit were
to again construe foreign publication, the same reasoning would be applied
in the case of extraterritorial publications by printing as had been applied
when the court was considering the effect of extraterritorial licensing.
VI. CONCLUSION

It is submitted that foreign publications cannot invest United States
protection. To this extent the Heim case is incorrect and the Copyright
Office regulation, by implication, is also wrong. In addition, it is also
submitted that foreign publications cannot divest American common law
rights as they are territorial. This is based upon Frohman and Becclwood
Music. The Basevi case is wrong.
No matter what has happened outside the United States, therefore, a
general publication in the United States will either invest statutory
protection or divest the American common law property right. The proper
approach in the current Ross Productscase would be to disregard publica117. 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1964).
118. 328 F.2d at 729.
119. Ibid. (Citation omitted.)
120. See Nom Music, Inc. v. Kaslin, 227 F. Supp. 922, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 343
F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1965); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Miracle Record Co., 91 F. Supp. 473,
475 (N.D.I1. 1950).
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tion outside the United States. If the court then finds a general publication
in the United States which satisfied the formalities of the United States
statute, American protection for the statutory term commencing with
that publication would have invested.
The copyright revision bill considered in the Eighty-ninth Congress' 2 '
provided that notice must be affixed to all copies distributed anywhere.122
If a similar bill is ultimately enacted, Congress will have made specific
provision. Since the term of copyright would also be altered to the life
of the author plus fifty years,123 and since the forfeiture possibilities are
well seasoned with safety factors,' 24 these issues will become less important. The term of copyright would no longer be computed as fixed,
starting with the date of publication, and the grant of Congress would,
thus, not be watered down by commencing protection with a first publication abroad. The unavailability of counsel in foreign parts would also be
less significant as the notice requirements would no longer be strictly
enforced so as to produce forfeitures.
As Justice Holmes said, "Congress could attach what conditions it saw
fit to its grant ....,,5 It is certainly better to have specific rules than
wide grey areas. It remains to be seen, however, whether such proposals
will ever be enacted into law.
121.

S. 1006, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
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